Exploring and Expanding the One-Pixel Attack by Khan, Umairullah et al.
Portland State University
PDXScholar
Student Research Symposium Student Research Symposium 2019
May 7th, 11:00 AM - 1:00 PM







Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/studentsymposium
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons, and the Engineering Commons
This Event is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student Research Symposium by an authorized
administrator of PDXScholar. For more information, please contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu.
Khan, Umairullah; Woods, Walt; and Teuscher, Christof, "Exploring and Expanding the One-Pixel Attack" (2019). Student Research
Symposium. 2.
https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/studentsymposium/2019/Posters/2
Exploring and Expanding the One-Pixel Attack
Umair Khan, Walt Woods, Christof Teuscher 
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
In machine learning research, adversarial examples are normal 
inputs to a classifier that have been specifically perturbed to
cause the model to misclassify the input. Recent work has 
demonstrated that several image-classifying deep neural 
networks (DNNs) can be reliably fooled with the modification 
of single pixel in the input image -- a technique referred to as 
the "one-pixel attack".    
 
We present data on three avenues of exploration into the attack
and consider future research directions: 
 
  (i) a modification in technique which produces lower attack 
      RMSE
 (ii) a comparison of the attack across different networks
(iii) an analysis of the attack via the generation of per-pixel 
       heatmaps for input images
   
4. Results
2. Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs)
Figure 1 -- The basic architecture of a convolutional neural network.
 
[Image by Raghav Prabhu, medium.com/@RaghavPrabhu. Colors have been modified.]
▪  Commonly used for image classification tasks.
▪  Build on basic neural networks by arranging neurons in three "spatial"
    dimensions -- height, width, and depth.
▪  Each grouping of neurons in the same three-dimensional "space" represents
    a convolution -- in this context, a mathematical operation on a matrix using 
    another matrix (kernel) that results in a new "feature map".
▪  Through training, these convolutional layers can "learn" features that 
    determine the classification of an image (e.g. eyes, tires, etc).
 
3. The One-Pixel Attack
▪  Technique initially described by J. Su, D.V. Vargas, and K. Sakurai in 2017 [1].
▪  Causes convolutional neural networks to misclassify input images by perturbing 
    just one pixel in the input image (Figure 2).
▪  Perturbations are encoded as five-element vectors (x, y, R, G, B) where the
    first two elements denote position and the last three encode a color value.
▪  Attacks are generated using a genetic algorithm known as differential evolution
    (Figure 3), though crossover is omitted.
Figure 2 -- A demonstration of the attack.
 
[Image from [1].]
randomly initialize 400 perturbations and calculate fitnesses
create 400 child solutions using xnew = x1 + 0.5(x2 - x3)
calculate each child's fitness -- if it is better than its parent's, replace the parent
repeat 100x, treating the updated population as the parent population
the perturbation with the best fitness is the "winner"
Figure 3 -- A flowchart
describing differential
evolution. Fitness is defined 
as the confidence in the 
correct label; x1, x2, and 
x3 are randomly selected 
members of the parent
population.
5. Conclusions
(1) Can we further improve the success of the one-pixel attack by investgating
      when and why differential evolution fails and addressing those problems? 
      Or is a new search algorithm necessary?
(2) How can we apply the one-pixel attack to other domains where machine
      learning is used (e.g. video applications)?
6. Acknowledgements / References
The authors acknowledge the support of the Maseeh College of Engineering 
and Computer Science (MCECS) through the Undergraduate Research and
Mentoring Program (URMP).
 
Contact: {ukhan, wwoods, teuscher}@pdx.edu
[1] J. Su, D.V. Vargas, and K. Sakurai. "One pixel attack for fooling deep neural
      networks", arXiv:1710.08864v5 [cs.LG], Jan. 2019.
[2] K. He, X. Zhang, S. Ren, and J. Sun. "Deep Residual Learning for Image
      Recognition", presented at the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and
      Pattern Recognition, Las Vegas, NV, USA, Jun. 2016.
[3] J.T. Springenberg, A. Dosovitskiy, T. Brox, and M. Riedmiller. "Striving
      for Simplicity: The All Convolutional Net", arXiv:1412.6806v3 [cs.LG],
      Apr. 2015.
▪  First and foremost, the data verifies the validity of the one-pixel technique --
    convolutional networks are susceptible to attack with minimal perturbation.
▪  The characteristics of a network have a significant impact on the attack,
    both in terms of attack success rate and RMSE.
▪  Differential evolution is clearly not maximizing the potential of the 
    one-pixel theory -- there are many cases where per-pixel analysis shows 
    a high attack potential but differential evolution fails to optimize to the
    best solution.
▪  With this in mind, there are a couple of avenues for future exploration:
1. Introduction
Table 1 -- A summary of the attack improvement based on the
new fitness function. The mean attack RMSE (averaged 
across 500 images) dropped by 19.5% while the success rate
improved slightly.
Table 2 -- A summary of the attack performance across CNNs of varying depth. Both the success rate and 
the mean attack RMSE decreased as networks deepened. Interestingly, RMSE is significantly lower




Figure 4 -- Examples of per-pixel heatmaps on various images (Basic network). Four
general cases are described along two axes: successful/unsuccessful attack and
effective/ineffective pixel. Examples of all cases are seen in all networks.
▪  A common metric used to quantify the "effect" of an
    adversarial attack is the root-mean-squared error (RMSE).
▪  In this context, defined as:
 
 ▪  Flatten the 32x32x3 image into 1x3072, and take the
    average squared difference between the original and new
    pixel -- since only one pixel is changed here, only three
    differences are summed, one for each color channel.
▪  The original fitness function was simply the confidence
    of the network in the correct label [1], which did not take 
    RMSE into account -- we revised the function to do so:
(i) ▪  The original paper attacks several networks [1], but all
    of them are of similar depth.
▪  To see how the attack performed against networks of
    varying depth, we implemented and attacked four
    different convolutional networks ranging from 2-14
    layers deep (Table 2).
▪  Basic: very simple two-convolution network.
▪  ResNet8: eight-layer implementation of the ResNet
    architecture [2], which utilizes "residual blocks" to
    increase accuracy.
▪  AllConv: essentially an upscaled version of Basic [3].
▪  ResNet14: 14-layer version of ResNet architecture.
▪  Though Basic is most vulnerable, other networks
    have significanly lower average RMSEs.
(ii) ▪  To analyze the basis of the one-pixel attack and cross-
    check the performance of DE, we generated per-pixel
    heatmaps of input images (Figure 4).
▪  At each pixel, 64 different color perturbations were
    applied and the maximum confidence change recorded
    on the heatmap.
▪  The majority of images are sensitive in at least one region.
▪  Four conclusions informed by the four rows of Figure 4:
(iii)
(1) Some images are vulnerable in many areas. (first row)
(2) Some images need very little perturbation. (second row)
(3) Differential evolution does not always find the most
     effective color. (third row)
(4) Differential evolution does not always find the most
     effective pixel to attack. (fourth row)
